The number of candidates or parties in an election contest has long been of theoretical interest (Duverger, 1964; Rae, 1971) . The measure has taken on added importance in recent years as researchers have studied the effects of thresholds, electoral formulas, district magnitude, presidentialism, and the like, on candidate and party numbers and on the strategic coordination that lies behind these effects (Cox, 1997; Jones, 1999; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989) . As every researcher soon learns, however, counting candidates or parties is not a trivial exercise.
The nature of the problem is obvious. In many elections, there are candidates or parties that win a tiny fraction of the overall vote, and there is a serious upward bias if every one of them is counted at full value. One can readily think of hypothetical examples -a vote distribution of 49.7 percent, 49.6 percent and 0.7 percent -and quickly find real-world examplesGerald Baker, running for U.S. president in 1984 as head of the Big Deal party, winning 825 votes out of more than 54 million cast -that illustrate the point. To say that there are three candidates in the hypothetical distribution or that the Big Deal Party counts equally with the major parties is to grossly exaggerate the number of (meaningful) candidates or parties.
The solution to the problem is much less obvious. One formula, however, has been widely accepted in the comparative literature. This is the so-called 'effective number' of candidates or parties -measured by the formula 1/∑vi 2 , where v i is the proportion of votes received by the i-th candidate or party (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) . Other measures have been proposed (Molinar, 1991) , but the effective N is by far the most frequently used, being applied variously to the distribution of votes in an election within a single district, the distribution of votes across parties in multiple districts (usually the entire country), or the distribution of seats in a legislature (where v i becomes the proportion of seats held by each party). 1 It is our contention here that while the effective N is an appropriate and useful measure of the number of parties in a nation (either in the electorate or the legislature), it is not necessarily a good measure of the number of candidates in a single district. We present our case for an alternative measure in the first section, liberally illustrating our argument with hypothetical examples, and we propose two new measures. Then we compare the results of the two new counts and the effective N in the case of Japan's election districts during the long period in which it used the single non-transferable vote (SNTV). This case, superbly analyzed by Reed (1991) , led him to conclude that strategic behavior among the voters and candidates resulted over the long-run in a reduction in the number of candidates to something over M + 1, where M is the number of candidates elected in a given district. Using our alternative definitions, we show that learning was much quicker and more complete than Reed realized, reducing the number of candidates, on average, to very close to M + 1 in a relatively short time.
Counting Candidates
Begin with the generic problem. Votes are distributed unevenly among a number of candidates or parties, some receiving only a small number. Should all the candidates or parties be counted? And what weight should they be given? If one is counting the number of parties nationwide (or in some other meaningful jurisdiction such as a state or province), one can make a good case that all should be counted. In legislative voting, for example, all parties can influence the outcome, possibly even being pivotal. In a parliamentary system, members of small parties as well as large parties may be part of the government. In Sartori's (1976) words, even small parties may have coalition or blackmail potential. Moreover, both in legislatures and in the electorate, small parties often have staying power -competing in one election after another for a considerable period of time.
Of course, a party with only a few votes is not the same as one with many votes. Some sort of discounting needs to be made. Any method of discounting is to some extent arbitrary, but the formula for the effective N gives results that most often accord with the judgment of thoughtful observers. Consider, for example, the hypothetical distributions of votes in Table 1 . Though one can argue about certain cases -such as whether there really are 3+ parties in row 1 -by and large the results make sense. Taagepera and Shugart (1989: 80-1) , for example, asked students to estimate the number of parties in hypothetical situations and found that the estimates compared well with the effective N. Not that there is complete agreement; a series of alternative measures has been proposed, and Molinar (1991) makes a good case for an alternative specification. Yet the effective N seems reasonable, and it has become the most widely used measure. 2 Now consider the problem of counting the number of candidates in a single district. Here the case for counting everyone is weaker. If our purpose is to look into the strategic behavior of candidates and voters, the important question is whether a candidate is viable, i.e. whether he or she stands a reasonable chance of winning. A viable candidate is likely to enjoy continued support; a non-viable candidate is likely to be abandoned by voters who wish to avoid wasting their votes. If our purpose is to study candidate characteristics, the important concern is again viability. A viable candidate is likely to be nominated in a later election; a non-viable candidate is likely to retire. 3 Similarly, a party with a low vote may win seats (depending on the electoral system and the distribution of its votes) and thus have some continuing power; a candidate with a low vote typically has no power base. A party winning a small number of votes is likely to retain a semblance of its organization; a candidate who wins only a few votes is usually out of business. 4 If the focus is on viability, the case for counting all candidates diminishes significantly, and the argument for using the effective N is much less compelling. Consider again the hypothetical vote distributions in Table 1 . If one asks how many viable candidates there are in row 1, the answer seems obviously to be two (assuming it is a single-member district). Only the candidates with 40 percent and 37 percent of the votes had, in retrospect, a reasonable chance of winning. 5 Yet the effective N is more than three. Row 4 represents an extreme example. Clearly, only the candidate with 70 percent of the votes had a significant chance of winning, yet the effective N is two. 6 Row 2 is less extreme, but it seems likely that most observers would count only one or two viable candidates, not close to three.
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The case for re-evaluating the use of the effective N to count candidates is strengthened when we consider multimember as well as single-member districts. 7 The effective N was designed without regard to the electoral system in which it was to be used. Specifically, it takes no account of the number of candidates who are elected in individual districts. Thus, for example, in Table 1 the effective N remains unchanged, whether the district magnitude is 1, 2, 3 or greater. Yet surely the number of viable candidates must depend on how many are elected. 8 In row 4, for example, only one candidate is viable if it is a single-member district, but multiple candidates are viable if it is a two-or-more member district. Indeed, an anomaly can occur with the effective N such that the number of meaningful (effective) candidates is less than the number of winning candidates. This would be the case in row 1 of Table 1 if M ≥ 4, for row 2 if M ≥ 3, and so on. While some such problems are likely to occur with all measures, they can be extreme with the effective N (e.g. row 4 if M ≥ 5).
How, then, shall we determine which of a district's candidates are viable? Since we are particularly interested in what makes a loser viable, we begin by asking: how large a vote is necessary for us to consider the (M + 1)th, the (M + 2)th, . . . vote-getters to be viable candidates? Surely their vote must be 'substantially' larger than 0; it must of course be less than 1/(M + 1) (or they are winners or tie with other potential winners). But exactly what level determines viability? There seems to be no a priori answer to this question. We will, therefore, propose two different values. While each one might be criticized as ad hoc, both are reasonable, and the general contours of the candidate count in our empirical analysis are similar with either definition.
Our first indicator of viability is set at half of the lowest vote level that would guarantee at least a tie and possibly a win, i.e., one-half of the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota, or [1/(M + 1)]/2 votes. If a loser obtains at least this number of votes, he or she is considered viable; otherwise not. Intuitively, this seems like a reasonable definition. Consider, for example, a singlemember district. The quota is 1 ⁄ 2. If a candidate cannot win at least half this amount (25 percent), he or she would hardly seem to have much chance of winning. The percentage required to be viable decreases at a declining rate as the number elected increases -to 1/6, 1/8, 1/10 and 1/12 of the vote, for M equaling 2 through 5 candidates, respectively.
The Hagenbach-Bischoff quota can also be seen as the number of votes obtained by each of the top M + 1 candidates under what Cox (1994) called a Duvergerian equilibrium. In a multimember district in which voters have only one vote (i.e. SNTV), voters will desert both the weak and the strong candidate. If a candidate lags very much behind the (M + 1)th candidate, his or her chance of being elected is slim indeed. Consequently, the voters who support him or her originally may turn to other candidates who are less preferred but stand a chance of winning. In contrast, if a candidate appears to have more support than necessary for winning, some of his or her supporters may decide to vote for other weaker but still winnable candidates so as not to waste their votes. Obviously, deserting the leading candidates is more problematic than dumping the weak, because if all or most supporters were to turn to other candidates, the leading candidates might actually end up losing the race. However, the tendency is there, and we can expect the working of both types of strategic behavior among the voters. As a result, there may be an equalization of votes among the top M + 1 candidates, with all other candidates receiving no votes. 9 Of course, in reality, things will not be that neat, but the logic of the situation still suggests that the vote for the (M + 1)th candidate should tend toward 1/(M + 1) of the vote, so it could be said that any candidate who garnered much less than that amount, say, less than [1/(M +1)]/2, had little chance of winning.
Unlike the effective N or the alternative measure we specify below, the quota has the characteristic of being fixed for a given M, making it particularly easy to determine the number of viable candidates. Also, given the importance of district magnitude to such things as the degree of proportionality (Lijphart, 1994; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989) , this fixed character might be seen as an advantage. In any event, the quota-based measure can take on larger or smaller values than the effective N, though it seems likely from hypothetical examples that it will typically yield a lower count in small-M districts. As the district magnitude becomes large, it may yield a higher count. Table 2 gives the same examples as in Table 1 , but the quota measure (and the alternative measure discussed below) are added. In every one of these examples, the quota measure is less than the effective N, except for some instances of M = 4. 10 In 10 of the 20 instances, the quota measure is arguably better than the effective N, with essentially the same count in 4 more. In all of the cases for M = 1, for example, the quota measure yields a more reasonable number, though for row 3 the count is essentially the same. A problem occurs on other occasions. In several instances with M = 3 (and in row 4 for M = 2 and above), the quota measure is subject to the anomaly noted above for the effective N -namely, that the count of viable candidates is less than the number of winners. 11 In light of this problem, we define an alternative indicator of viability. For Note: It is assumed that the winner(s) is ( this measure, we first count all winners as viable. This means that there will no longer be cases in which the number of viable candidates is smaller than the number of seats available (barring the highly unusual circumstance in which the actual number of candidates running is less than M). We then observe the ratio of votes between each loser and the last winner, counting candidates as viable if this ratio is 0.70 or above, i.e. if a loser obtains at least 70 percent of the vote obtained by the last winner. 12 We dub it the 70 percent LW rule.
This definition takes account of the fact that in some instances, especially in large multimember districts, the winner with the lowest vote total may garner only a small fraction of the vote, so that losers with, say, 7 percent or 8 percent or even less might be relatively close to winning. Thus, it does not exclude candidates based on an absolute lower boundary, such as 5 percent or 1 percent of the vote. Of course, the 70 percent figure is arbitrary, but it is not unreasonable. Clearly, if a losing candidate comes nowhere close to gaining the number of votes won by the last winner, he or she should not be considered viable. The question is where to draw the dividing line.
The problem of determining the number of viable candidates, and therefore of where to draw the dividing line, may have its closest parallel in US studies of the competitiveness of election contests. Seats (in single-member districts) are often considered 'safe' if the two-party vote division is greater than 55-45 percent or 60-40 percent (e.g. Tidmarch et al., 1986) , where 'safe' means that only the advantaged candidate has a realistic chance of winning the election (or, in our terms, only one candidate is viable). It is understood, of course, that any such split is arbitrary. Indeed, there may be circumstances, such as in times of large swings from one election to another, in which even a 60 percent winner is not really in a safe seat (Jacobson, 1987) . Yet these cutoff points remain in general use because they seem, most often, to capture the essence of what is meant by a safe seat (one-candidate viability). 13 Significantly, the 70 percent rule lies between these two commonly used divisions, corresponding to a split of 58.8/41.2 percent (i.e. 58.8 ϫ 0.70 = 41.2).
The candidate count using the 70 percent LW rule is shown for the same distributions as above in Table 2 . Note that as district magnitude changes, it may be alternately lower and higher than the effective N. This is as it should be. Surely the number of viable candidates cannot always be unchanging as one moves from single-member to four-member districts. No measure is perfect, of course. In row 3, with M = 1, one might argue that all three of the top candidates are viable, but the third candidate falls just below the 70 percent LW rule, yielding only two viable candidates, while both the effective N and the 1 ⁄ 2 quota measure show three such candidates. Yet the advantages over the effective N in all of the other situations shown in the table far outweigh this one questionable instance.
The hypothetical votes in Table 3 further highlight the characteristics of
the various counting methods. They remind us, first, that the effective N is not a good measure of candidate viability. As the vote going to the third candidate declines (for either M = 1 or M = 2), that candidate's chance of winning steadily decreases (and, especially at first, the fourth and fifth candidates have little chance of winning). Surely, then, the number of viable candidates does not increase. Even so, the effective N increases. As we indicated at the outset, the increasing values of N make sense if one is counting the number of parties that have some role in the system and these are vote percentages for a set of districts (especially the entire country) or if they are seats in a legislature. But not if we are counting candidates. The examples in Table 3 also demonstrate the knife-edge quality of the measures we propose, a feature that may seem troublesome. Consider rows 3 and 4 for M = 1 or rows 10 and 11 or 14 and 15 for M = 2. In each pair, the distributions of votes are nearly identical. Yet one of the proposed new measures changes as one moves from one row to the next. Two comments are in order. First, though sharp distinctions of this sort are not necessarily ideal, we often make them. As noted above, the American literature on candidate competition often classifies districts by whether the winning candidate receives more than 55 or 60 percent of the votes. Similarly, a sharp cutoff point is sometimes used to eliminate candidates who are considered non-serious (see note 2). Moreover, the most highly developed theory about candidate competition (the M + 1 rule) makes knife-edge predictions. Note: For definitions, see Table 2 .
Second, though the effective N is nearly unchanged from one row to the next (in each pair), constancy is not a virtue if it is inadequately measuring candidate viability. As to the pros and cons between the 1 ⁄ 2 quota measure and the 70 percent LW rule, it seems that the latter is often superior to the former, especially in cases of large numbers of candidates with few votes (e.g. Table 2 , row 4). However, it should be kept in mind that the former is based on the assumption that there emerge Duvergerian equilibria under which all winners obtain equal shares of the vote and all others obtain zero votes. If something close to this equilibrium does occur, the 70 percent LW rule is a more stringent test than the 1 ⁄ 2 quota measure. That is it requires 70 percent instead of 50 percent of the quota, possibly lowering the number of viable candidates, as in Table 2 , row 2 with M = 1 and in a number of rows in Table 3 . But in situations deviating greatly from the Duvergerian equilibrium, such as Table 2 , row 4 for M≥2, in which the last winner gets wins much less than 1/(M + 1) of the vote, the 70 percent LW rule may be the better measure.
Thus, rather than trying to choose between the two measures, we might think in terms of the following. The 1 ⁄ 2 quota rule is a stringent test of the extent to which a situation conforms to the equilibrium outcome, namely, that there are only M + 1 viable candidates, and each of them obtains an equal number of votes. In all circumstances, but especially if the votes are far from equalized and the 1 ⁄ 2 quota rule appears dramatically to undercount the number of viable candidates, the 70 percent LW provides an excellent count to test the extent to which there is deviation from the M + 1 rule.
A Reanalysis of the Number of Candidates in Japan under SNTV
In pathbreaking work proposing an M + 1 rule -an extension of Duverger's Law -for the expected number of candidates under SNTV, Reed (1990) (using data through 1986) reported that the number of candidates in Japanese elections was often greater than M + 1 in initial elections (1947, 1949, . . .) , but that the number declined steadily, approximating M + 2 to M + 1.75 from about 1963 through 1976, and then declined to about M + 1.5 from 1979 through 1986. He interprets the results as showing that learning occurred in response to the early elections and that, over time, the number of candidates approximated the M + 1 rule. 14 We re-analyze the data from 1947-93 (when Japan changed to a new electoral system) using the two counting methods proposed above. For comparison purposes, we also calculate the effective N, which basically duplicates and updates Reed's calculations. 15 Detailed results are shown in the Appendix. A summary is provided in Table 4 and in Figures 1-3 . No matter which of these displays is used, a Election years number of conclusions are apparent. First, using either of our proposed measures, the numbers of candidates are uniformly less than Reed reported using the effective N. 16 Especially in the early years, large numbers of candidates entered the elections, but many of them were marginal, winning a very small percentage of the vote. In fact in 1947, most districts -even threemember districts -had 10 or more nominal candidates; many had 15 or more. Maximum numbers were 24, 25 and 26, in 3-, 4-and 5-member constituencies, respectively. These large numbers of nominal candidates raised the effective N so that in 1947-1952, well over a third of the 3-person districts had 7 or more 'effective' candidates (M + 4); similar fractions of the 4-person districts had 9 or more (M + 5); and more than half of the 5-person districts had 10 or more (M + 5) (Table A.1 ). Yet when we count how many candidates had as much as 70 percent of the vote of the last winning candidate (or 1 ⁄ 2 the quota), the numbers fall dramatically. In the first three elections, typically less than 5 percent of the districts had M + 4 or M + 5 viable candidates. The difference between the effective N and the number of viable candidates declined over time, but the former yielded a larger count in every election for each district magnitude (Figures 1-3) . 17 Second, the results based on numbers of viable candidates match the M + 1 rule even more closely than Reed suggested. This is perhaps the most striking finding. existence of non-Duvergerian equilibria (see note 9) provides a theoretical basis for expecting somewhat more than M + 1 candidates even in the face of instrumentally rational voters. But very little in the way of auxiliary explanations is necessary. From 1960 on, 50 percent to nearly two-thirds of the districts had exactly M + 1 viable candidates. An additional 10 percent or so had M candidates, leaving no more than a fifth to a third with M + 2 (and, infrequently, more than M + 2) candidates. The M + 1 rule was an extraordinarily powerful predictor of the number of viable candidates in Japanese election districts under SNTV. 18 Third, as shown by Cox (1997: ch. 5 ), the larger the district magnitude, the larger the number of candidates relative to M. This may have a lot to do with the fact that the larger the district magnitude, the more difficult it is for voters even to recognize all of the candidates' names, let alone to evaluate them all at once. As a result, voters may find it hard to know which candidates are in the top M + 1 set. Also, potential candidates are more likely incorrectly to believe that they are able to win a small percentage of votes so as to win in a large-M district than to believe that they can attract the large percentage of votes typically needed to win a small-M district (Hsieh and Niemi, 1999: 104-5) . This is, to a certain extent, equivalent to saying that non-Duvergerian equilibria are more likely to occur in large districts than in small ones. In any event, in the Japanese case, the percentages of districts with ≥ M + 2 candidates (averaged over the entire time period) are 25, 35 and 40 for 3-, 4-and 5-member districts, respectively, using the 1 ⁄ 2 quota measure. The numbers are 27, 41 and 48 using 70 percent LW. For the effective N, they are 61, 69, 71.
Fourth, counting viable rather than effective numbers of candidates suggests there was much less learning than Reed inferred. 19 The fact is that there was much less to be learned (or, alternatively, that learning occurred very quickly, even before the first ballots were cast). Consider Figure 1 , which shows the results for three-candidate districts. While the effective N suggests that the average number of candidates in the first few elections was 5 1 ⁄ 2 to 6, our counts suggest that there were only 4 to 4 1 ⁄ 2 viable candidates, barely more than M + 1 in the very first elections. The contrast is every more stark in Figures 2 and 3 , where the effective N in the early elections is about two candidates more than the number who were viable by the 70 percent LW rule and as many as four candidates more than by the 1 ⁄ 2 quota rule. Of course, some learning did take place, especially in the early years. This is most apparent in Table 4 , which shows that the proportion of districts with M + 1 candidates increased right up through the late 1980s and early 1990s. But even in the first three elections, a third to a half or more of the districts had no more than M + 1 viable candidates, results close enough to the theoretical upper bound that a shallow learning curve would be expected. 20 Fifth, using the new measures, the number of districts with M candidates is nontrivial, which is in line with Cox's emphasis (1997: 101-2) on M + 1 as an upper bound, not a point estimate, on the expected number of
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candidates. As he notes, there are reasons, having nothing to do with strategic voting, to believe that more than M candidates will typically enter an election, but the possibility of one-party dominance in single-member districts or comparable situations in multimember districts should not be overlooked. When one considers that in Japan the Communist Party regarded elections as an opportunity for propaganda and ran candidates in every district, regardless of the chances of winning (Reed, 1990: 350) , the number of districts with only M candidates takes on even greater meaning.
Discussion
We anticipate some resistance to the idea that the 1 ⁄ 2 quota or 70 percent LW rules are a superior way of counting candidates in individual districts. They are, after all, very simple rules, and their arbitrary nature is all too evident. (Why 1 ⁄ 2 as opposed to 0.60? Why 0.70 rather than 2/3?) The effective Nbesides having a legacy of acceptance by a variety of authors -has a certain cachet owing to its non-obvious calculation. Nonetheless, we believe that when the goal is to count viable candidates in a single election district, as opposed to the number of parties gaining votes or representation in a set of districts, the methods proposed here provide superior measures.
For one thing, the effective N is equally arbitrary even though it may not appear so at first glance. Molinar's (1991) critique, in which he proposes a variant that counts the winning party or candidate as 1 and then adds a fraction of the effective N (weighted by the contribution of the smaller parties), indicates how readily different effective-N-like measures might be proposed (see also Taagepera, 1999) . More importantly, the new measures are better because they adhere more closely to what it means to win a given percentage of the votes in a district. Unlike a small party in a PR situation, where it might influence the make-up or even become a part of the government, or a small party in a legislature, which might hold the balance of power, candidates in individual districts either win or lose. And candidates are viable if, and only if, they receive enough votes to be fairly close to winning, whether that percentage in a given situation is relatively large or quite small.
As to our empirical application, our results might seem too good. It might seem suspicious -or in some way circular -that we devised a measure that gave us a near-perfect fit to theoretical expectations. It is not so. First, there is nothing in the logic of our measures that guarantees that the number of candidates will be near M + 1. Elections can be uncontested (exactly M candidates), competitive among M + 1 candidates, or contested by M + 2 or more candidates (where the competition may only be for the last seat or may be for multiple seats).
Moreover, the case of Taiwan, which also uses SNTV, shows this (Hsieh and Niemi, 1999) . In the four legislative (Yuan) elections from 1986 through 1999, some 40-50 percent of the districts had M + 1 candidates according S 8 ( 1 ) to the 70 percent LW rule, which is a lower proportion than in most elections in Japan. 21 There was also greater divergence between the 1 ⁄ 2 quota and 70 percent LW rules in Taiwan than in Japan. At the same time, the number of viable candidates was sensitive to district magnitude (increasing as M rose), which was also true in Japan. Thus, our results for the Japanese election outcomes are not artifacts of our method in the sense that they are a necessary outcome of the measures we adopted. 22 Does the 1 ⁄ 2 quota or the 70 percent LW rule solve all counting problems for individual districts? No. In any instance where there is not a 'natural' count, there are cases 'near the edge' that are problematic. So it is with these rules, as we pointed out above in discussing Table 2 , row 3. Nor do they resolve questions about what might have been. Thus, for example, in elections with non-Duvergerian equilibria (say, 40, 15, 15, 15 , 15 percent in a single-member district), each of the nominal candidates might have been able to win if only certain subsets of them had run (and, in that sense, all were viable), or only one or two of the 'minor' candidates might have come close to defeating the front-runner. Nor, finally, do our measures solve the theoretical problem of moving between numbers of candidates in individual districts and the number of parties in a country. Nevertheless, given an outcome in an individual district and the goal of counting the number of viable candidates, the 1 ⁄ 2 quota and 70 percent LW measures are formidable challengers for best measure and are surely an improvement over the effective N.
From a substantive point of view, our re-analysis of the Japanese results lends still further empirical support to the M + 1 rule. Further, the fact that the results hold using our two new measures, particularly the 1 ⁄ 2 quota rule, suggests that the Duvergerian equilibrium, under which only the top M + 1 candidates are viable and each of them obtains an equal number of votes, has considerable applicability in the real world. district) and thus exercise some power. Nonetheless, the differences in power and durability suggest a greater focus on viability when the concern is with candidates. 5 We recognize that a priori probabilities of winning are not always reliably judged from votes obtained. Since there is typically no way of judging the former (apart from high profile races where there is good polling data), we, along with most analysts, use votes as a guide to these unobservable probabilities. 6 Taagepera (1999) recently noted that where there is one-party dominance the effective N is an overestimate. He recommends that the effective N be supplemented with another measure: 1/v 1 in our notation. This reduces the count, but it still suggests for the case at hand that there are nearly one and a half candidates (1.43 to be precise). Moreover, it does not address the question raised below about multimember districts. 7 We assume the use of SNTV, under which each voter has only one vote and the M candidates with the most votes are elected. However, our proposed measures are also useful in majority run-off elections and for counting party lists under proportional representation, for which Cox (1997: chs. 5 Table 1 , row 1). (Were one to apply the effective N formula to approval votes without normalizing, the results could be surprisingly small or large. In the case at hand, the effective N would be 0.78. If there were three candidates approved by 40, 20 and 10 percent, a direct calculation of the effective N would yield 4.76 compared to 2.33 when first normalized.) 8 In fact, the number of candidates who are meaningful in other senses also depends on the number elected. Consider the example in row 5. If M = 1, candidates 3-5 might each hold the balance between candidates 1 and 2. But if M = 2, the difference in votes between candidates 1 and 2 no longer matters, significantly diminishing the power of the last three candidates. 9 This is the Duvergerian equilibrium. Non-Duvergerian equilibria, in which more than M + 1 candidates emerge, may occur if two or more runners-up possess nearly identical expected vote totals. For a detailed discussion of these two types of equilibria, see Cox (1994) . 10 The quota measure will be greater than the effective N in small districts when one party wins a relatively high proportion and one or more additional parties win above the quota. For example, in a single-member district and the distribution 63, 33, 4, the quota measure is 2.0 and the effective N is 1.97. 11 This problem occurs, in general, when one or more popular candidates win enough votes that 'lower' but winning candidates do not meet the defined threshold. It can also occur when a large number of minor candidates siphon off sufficient votes from winning candidates. 12 Though arrived at independently, this measure bears some similarity to Cox's (1994 Cox's ( , 1997 ) SF ratio, the ratio of the second to the first loser. However, they
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are clearly measuring different things (Gaines, 1997: 53-56 Cox (1997: ch. 5 ) formalizes the M + 1 rule and tests some of its implications using data through 1993. However, his tests use the SF ratio (see note 12 above), so he does not calculate the number of candidates per se. 15 Our data are drawn from: 1947-55 (Reed, 1992); 1958-90 (Lijphart Elections Archive at http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij); 1993 (Miyakawa, 1996) . Our results for the 1947-86 period do not perfectly match Reed's. However, the differences are minor. 16 Interestingly, Taagepera (1999: 503) cites a number of historical cases (including Japan) in which he feels that the effective N overestimates the number of meaningful parties. He suggests supplementing the effective N with another measure, which is always less than or equal to the effective N. 17 As shown in Figures 1-3 , the 70 percent LW rule always produces more, and the 1 ⁄ 2 quota rule fewer, viable candidates than expected in the first several elections. This occurs because the earlier elections deviate not only from the M + 1 rule, but also from equalization of votes among the top M + 1 candidates as in the equilibrium analysis. In the case of the three-person districts, for example, the average standard deviation for the vote shares received by the top four candidates drops from 0.054 in 1947 to 0.045 in 1949 to 0.038 in 1952, showing less equalization in the earlier period. 18 A different approach to the question of whether parties nominated the 'correct' number of candidates is found in Browne and Patterson (1999) . It relies on a comparison of whether a party could have won more seats if it had nominated a smaller or larger number of candidates, but it does not focus on the overall number of candidates in a given election. They conclude that parties made very few mistakes, with nominating too many candidates being much more frequent than nominating too few. See also Cox (1999) . 19 We are referring primarily to learning on the part of the voters, who learned quickly not to waste their votes on non-viable candidates. Evidently, in the earlier elections, some non-viable candidates declined to drop out despite their low likelihood of being elected, or parties nominated them for reasons beyond their likelihood of winning, thus keeping the effective candidate count higher. But this behaviour on the part of candidates and parties does not alter the fact that voters concentrated their votes on around M + 1 individuals. The contribution of candidates and parties versus voters in lending support to the M + 1 rule is one of the more fascinating and still controversial aspects of this theory. See, for example, Cox (1994) , who relies solely upon voters' strategic behavior though he mentions candidates' strategies as well, and Jesse (1999: 337) , who argues that party strategic behavior plays a greater role than voter behavior under STV in Ireland and Tasmania. 20 Also, note that if one uses the effective N, the extension of the results to 1993
suggests that the lessons of the prior four decades were 'unlearned', as the number of districts with M + 2 or more candidates increased (Table 4) . Using the other measures, the proportion of districts with exactly M + 1 candidates increased throughout the entire period, despite upswings in candidate numbers in 1993 (Table A.1) . 21 Generally, the reason that electoral results were more 'volatile' in Taiwan than in Japan may have a lot to do with the fact that democratization began in Taiwan only in 1986 and took shape around 1992, when all the members of the Legislative Yuan were subject to re-election. It is true that there had been elections for the members of the Legislative Yuan since 1969, and voters might have learned something in the early elections. But when democratization started in 1986 with heightened competition between the ruling party and the opposition parties, the voters might have had to, to some extent, go through the learning process once again. 22 We have concentrated on the Japanese case because of the theoretical interest sparked by Reed's work. The utility of our proposed measures to single-member simple plurality systems is most apparent in a multiparty setting such as exists in contemporary Canada. In 1997, based on the effective N, the mean number of candidates contesting each district was 2.89. Yet it is rare for more than two candidates to have a reasonable chance of winning in any given district (judging from the distribution of votes won). Indeed, many districts had only one viable candidate. If one were to use the effective N, the average number of candidates (2.89), as well as the number in many individual districts (>2.50 in 82.1 percent of the districts), is larger than the predicted upper bound of M + 1. Judging by the number of viable candidates, counted by either the 1 ⁄ 2 quota or the 70 percent LW method, the average number of candidates is well below that limit (1.70 and 1.40, respectively), and the upper bound of M + 1 is rarely exceeded (8.0 percent and 5.0 percent, respectively).
